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 Writing an Important Body of Scholarship:
 A Proposal for an Embodied Rhetoric
 of Professional Practice
 Jane E. Hindman
 I begin my reasoning and reflecting (as I almost always do) in the throes
 of contradiction. On this occasion, the inconsistency concerns our profes
 sional standing. I'm not gesturing to the oft-mentioned conflict between
 our institutional status as gatekeepers of Standard Written English and
 our disciplinary claim to be oppositional intellectuals. That paradox does
 indeed deserve attention and plays a significant role in my inquiry, but as
 a point of departure I want to explore a puzzling discrepancy between the
 content of our disciplinary arguments and the discursive moves that
 enable them. My hope is that the exploration will reveal the ideological
 constraints of the abstract, rationalist, disembodied rhetoric our profes
 sion usually demands. Since it is by definition constrained by the logic of
 noncontradiction and by professional standards, that rhetoric mystifies
 the professional practices that authorize it.
 Such mystification of our discourse renders us vulnerable to Jack
 Selzer's charge that "the relationship of rhetorical events to the material
 world that sustains and produces them has not often enough been fully
 elaborated or clearly articulated" (9). Like other authors in Selzer and
 Crowley's Rhetorical Bodies?a collection that attempts to "steer rheto
 ric more firmly in the direction of those elaborations and articulations"?
 I too witness the need for a more "material rhetoric" (9).
 More specifically, and like Yameng Liu's contribution to the collec
 tion, I am predisposed to focus on what Foucault describes as the
 prohibitive procedures that allow?in fact, demand?discourse "to evade
 its ponderous, awesome materiality" and ensure that "we do not have the
 right to say everything" (216). Liu's specific analysis uncovers the
 discursive procedures by which the media determine the public' s percep
 jac 22.1 (2002)
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 tion that Dick Morris's most serious ethical lapse is "neither his involve
 ment in the sex scandal nor even his betrayal of trust, but his flagrant
 transgression of established political, ideological, and ultimately rhetori
 cal boundaries" (315). This determination of Morris' ethics, Liu argues,
 results from the ideology of journalistic coverage that demands partisan
 control of rhetorical skills and distinct reverence for the demarcation
 between either/or; in journalistic discourse, that ideology functions as "a
 key mechanism in regulating the deployment and movement of human
 resources in contemporary rhetorical practices" (316).
 Liu's insightful conclusions regarding the prohibitions on material
 ity in journalistic discourse clearly describe the partisan, rationalist
 ideology denying materiality and informing the discourse I will consider.
 But unlike Liu or any of the contributors to Rhetorical Bodies, I ask us to
 turn our critical gaze to our own professional discursive practice. By
 professional discursive practice, I mean the entextualization involved in
 what we do as professionals: reading, writing, and evaluating students'
 and our own discourse(s). Excluding those occasions when what we
 profess is technical and/or "professional" writing and/or "creative"
 writing, the practices I want to consider are those in which we produce and
 consume academic discourse in our capacities as professional rhetori
 cians and compositionists as well as the material conditions that authorize
 that discourse. I hope to show that, like the journalistic discourse Liu
 considers, our scholarship authorizes a peculiarly restrictive and abstract
 ideology and that "regulation of the flqw of embodied rhetorical re
 sources" is that ideology's "characteristic mode of operation" (317).
 My argument requires two moves. First, I will identify a specific set
 of our professional discursive practices, those that not only support Shari
 Benstock's claim that "the question of' genre' often rides on the question
 of gender" but that also disable efforts to institute change in the academy
 (148).1 Second, as antidote to these gendered power relations, I will
 propose "embodied rhetoric," a rhetoric characterized and authorized in
 part by specific sorts of "personal" author- and context-saturated gestures
 to everyday life that replace or supplement our conventional discursive
 gestures to an always already constituted authority. I initiate my concep
 tion of an embodied rhetoric with Nancy Miller's notion of "personal
 criticism" (in part to emphasize the "criticism" crucial to the discursive
 style I propose and in part to be specific in my use of the commonly over
 determined term "personal") and then build on Miller's original concep
 tion of personal criticism in three crucial ways. Finally?and in order to
 demonstrate how one can embody the rhetoric, the ideology, the affect,
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 the contradictions our profession demands?I will gesture to the events
 that precipitated this argument. I hope to convince you that an embodied
 rhetoric, one that gestures to autobiographical as well as disciplinary
 authority, not only accounts for the contradictions inherent in ponderous
 materiality but also loosens the rhetorical constraints hindering our
 adapting to the exigencies and contingencies of our profession. Embod
 ied rhetoric regenders academic discursive practice and thus assures
 agency and power to feminist theory and praxis. By implication, then,
 it also facilitates our efforts to effect change in our own and in our
 students' lives.
 Ideological Constraints in Professional Rhetoric
 I began by declaring a puzzling discrepancy between the content of our
 disciplinary arguments and the discursive moves that enable them.
 Consider, for example, the last decade's proliferation in composition
 studies of well-respected arguments dismissing foundationalist claims to
 knowledge about writing and the composing process, advocating
 constructivist views of the inherently social nature of that process, and
 explaining how anti-foundationalist theory can inform our classroom
 practice. Indeed, this latter feature of rhetoric and composition's specific
 "body of knowledge"?namely, the capacity to marry theory and prac
 tice?either always has been or has come to be seen as its distinctive
 quality. Sharon Crowley has argued that "because composition cheer
 fully operates without a founding theory, it has never generated a readily
 identifiable discipline" (192). Yet, such cheerful operation becomes less
 and less possible as composition achieves legitimate disciplinary status.
 Such status secures not just individual jobs but also a collective place in
 the institution, as well as the authority to speak as professionals. Securing
 a legitimate territory is the aim of the process of professionalization;
 legitimation is always already any profession's "will to truth," a term
 Foucault uses to describe a particular aspect of discursive prohibition?
 namely, the opposition between true and false. Resolving the legitimation
 crisis provokes any profession's defining and protecting the boundaries
 of its self-professed and discrete body of knowledge, its system for
 determining merit, its procedures for generating new knowledge, and its
 process for reproducing authority.
 Composition's specific will to truth, as Lynn Worsham argues,
 materializes in its particular "epistemological attitude" and its "peda
 gogical imperative" ("Writing" 98). The profession's epistemology, she
 explains, appears to be "both transpersonal and objective" but is actually
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 "based on subjective needs and desires," while its "will to pedagogy"
 requires "every theory of writing to translate into a pedagogical practice
 or at least some specific advice for teachers" (83,96). These are both
 institutionally created, sanctioned and maintained practices, require
 ments that academic authors must satisfy if they wish to authorize their
 professional discourse. Hence, while it may indeed be the case that
 composition has no founding theory per se, we seem at the very least to
 have a founding faith, a self-professed creed: producing and consuming
 writing theory?that is, the newest and best of the profession's important
 body of knowledge?improves (if not confers) one's capacity not just to
 theorize about but also to teach composition well. This faith sustains our
 expertise and our discipline as not simply a "service" requiring no
 theoretical grounding or academic rigor; nor is it an abstraction
 disconnected from the social realities of writing bodies. Clearly,
 rhetoric and composition studies is "about" the marriage of theory and
 practice. It has to be.
 Nonetheless, and as Stanley Fish has relentlessly reminded us,
 linking composition studies with an anti-foundationalist position?and,
 by implication, with any particular theoretical position?can "bring with
 itno pedagogical payoff; [likewise] being opposed to anti-foundationalism
 [or any theoretical position] entails no pedagogical penalty," for there is,
 "as James Reither observes, no transition from 'knowing that' to 'know
 ing how'" (335). Indeed, our discrete body of knowledge?the nature of
 rhetoric and its procedures as well as the most effective and ethical
 methods for teaching that supposedly unattainable transition?have
 perplexed philosophers and practitioners for eons. In fact, the particular
 practices manifesting composition's will to truth reenact the long quarrel
 between rhetoric and philosophy. Ironically, these same practices also
 sustain not just a "hostility to rhetoric" but also an "anti-professional
 ism," labels that Fish gives to the desire that "enforces a distinction
 between professional labors on the one hand and the identification and
 promotion of what is true or valuable on the other" (215). Thus, our
 discipline' s marriage of convenience makes for uneasy bedfellows, for its
 consummation is logically impossible.
 It's not rhetorically impossible, however. In fact, the "will to peda
 gogy" necessitates that rhetorical move?which, it would seem, is made
 but not recognized, practiced but not allowed. "Why has the field of
 composition disallowed such a discourse?" asks Victor Vitanza, for
 whom exploring the mystification informing the field's interests and
 practices is crucial. Vitanza recognizes that such a discourse would
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 require innovative rhetorical practices, "uncanny criticisms ... with the
 sole purpose of establishing the (postmodern) conditions for the possi
 bilities of discourse in and about writing theory and pedagogy"; it would
 necessitate conceiving a professional discourse that "requires itself to
 bear witness to what has been disallowed" (139). Likewise recognizing
 the need for innovation in professional discursive practice, Lynn Worsham
 invites a rhetoric of theory, a "rhetoric of inquiry [that] goes further than
 the deconstructive insight that the rhetorical or tropological dimension of
 language undermines straightforward grammatical meaning" and moves
 toward intervention into discursive practices through "a new
 metalanguage" that describes "theory as a set of tropes that structure
 inquiry" and that "redescribes the humanities and social sciences in
 rhetorical terms" ("Rhetoric" 393).
 To my mind, the rhetorical turn that Worsham and Vitanza advocate
 becomes possible through rhetorical analyses of how we as professionals
 "do" theory, how our professional practices drive the discipline. Such
 analysis requires studying not just the teaching of writing as a means for
 transcribing thoughts but also our scholarly, administrative, teacherly
 rhetoric as a method of inventing and judging and interpreting episte
 mologies. Composition studies, Worsham tells us, "offers an especially
 productive place for studying the many ways a field constitutes itself
 rhetorically?in general, through strategies of invention, judgment, and
 argumentation" ("Rhetoric" 395). As scholars, we compositionists can
 offer this productivity in part because our process of professionalization
 is so recent and in part because writing itself?as Foucault well docu
 ments?is central to the technology of disciplinary procedures. Worsham
 explains that not just social space and knowledge fields but even "what
 we take to be the most private and personal of phenomena?emotion and
 the body?are effects of social organization and are made available for
 public administration through the techniques of discipline"; thus, in
 order "to understand the discipline that has evolved to study and teach
 writing, we must understand the way it works at both the semantic and
 affective levels to produce and organize knowledge and experience"
 ("Rhetoric" 397).
 I agree wholeheartedly with her conclusion that "what is needed is a
 feminist critique of the disciplinary discourse of composition studies."
 As my particular method of answering Worsham's call to "challenge the
 claim that through the appropriation of various theories and approaches
 the field escapes the disciplinary apparatus of modern patriarchal soci
 ety," I will explore the construction and perpetuation of academic
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 authority itself ("Rhetoric" 398). My purpose will be to make visible the
 source of the legitimacy of what we do as compositionists and uncover the
 possibilities for feminist agency in our practices as professional academ
 ics. To that end, let me turn to feminist autobiography theorist Shari
 Benstock's claim regarding the interface of genre and gender and to my
 ensuing charge that our professional discourse and practice are
 "masculinist" and therefore confining. Conventionally, ubiquitously,
 and, of course, regardless of the biological gender of its author, the
 figuring of this academic discourse is masculinist: it is represented and
 taught as if it were coherent, method(olog)ical, articulate, consistent,
 democratic (or at least impartial and consensual), and, most importantly,
 rational. Further, our theorizing of this academic discourse has histori
 cally, persistently, and blindly been considered the necessary, provoca
 tive, and generative impetus to our pedagogical and scholarly practices.
 We professionals recognize that these representations are not entirely
 accurate. Indeed, within the pages of our professional journals, review
 ers' reports, and peer evaluations we debate?sometimes vehemently?
 the (anti)foundational, (a)rhetorical, (in)accurate nature of such claims
 about our discourse. Probably the most effectual efforts to revise the
 disciplinary response to what Worsham has termed the field' s "pedagogi
 cal imperative" have been feminist arguments for "a nonoppressive,
 dialogic relationship between theory and practice" (Ede 327), for a
 "postdisciplinary" notion of the relationship between teaching and theory
 (see Harkin). This enterprise has yet to have much of an effect on the
 discipline, however. We persist (sometimes to ourselves, usually to other
 professionals, and almost without exception to our first-year composition
 students) in our representations of academic discourse as a more or less
 transparent and intellectually superior technology best suited to a disin
 terested, objective pursuit of truth. This masculinist figuration of our
 discourse inscribes what Pierre Bourdieu terms "misrecognition," a
 voluntary, culturally endorsed process that creates "a truth whose sole
 meaning and function are to deny a truth known and recognized by all, a
 lie which would deceive no one were not everyone determine to deceive
 [her or] himself (133).
 Misrecognition is, of course, instrumental to sustaining the status of
 a profession(al): it's the strong will of professionalization that inextrica
 bly links our status as a legitimate discipline to our strong will to be the
 disciplinarians of (and disciplined by) our profession. As Magali Larson
 explains in The Rise of Professionalism, "The singular characteristic of
 professional power [is]... that the profession has the exclusive privilege
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 of defining both the content of its knowledge and the legitimate condi
 tions of access to it, while the unequal distribution of knowledge protects
 and enhances this power" (48). Further characteristics of the professional
 project, Larson tells us, are its production of "at least a minimal sense of
 the cognitive superiority ... which distinguishes all... [professionals]
 from the laity" and its tendency toward the "monopolization of status and
 work privileges in an occupational hierarchy" (47, 51). Finally, it is
 "ideologically necessary for the legitimation of monopoly that instruc
 tion?the acquisition of competence?appear to be accessible to all who
 seek it and are able to assimilate it" (51). This ideological cover serves to
 protect and enhance the inequity in status that professionalization con
 structs, for as professionals our business is to define and control legiti
 mate access (our "gatekeeping" function) to the knowledge that we
 construct and authorize (our scholarly function). Thus, according to
 Larson's perspective anyway, the mystification that comprises
 misrecognition also defines professionalism?at least in part.2
 Vitanza rightly identifies the source of compositionists' most crucial
 professional misrecognitions: "(1) the will to systematize (the) language
 (of composing), (2) the will to be its author(ity), and (3) the will to teach
 it to students" (140). But he's overly hasty in assuming that these
 characteristics emerge singularly and/or only from "the strong will of the
 field of composition," for, at least in one sense, this institutionalized
 denial and/or (mis)recognition is not unusual or discipline-specific (140).
 In fact, it's commonplace not only in the academy but throughout our
 capitalist economy. (As a particularly poignant example, consider that at
 the time of this writing, our nation as it is embodied in the president urges
 us to (mis)recognize Osama bin Laden and the Taliban as "pure evil" and
 to deny earlier U.S. political interests in collaborating with both and thus
 providing their military and intelligence training.) Our profession?like
 all others?is self-professed, self-constructed, self-affirmed, self-admin
 istered; in other words, ours is an autobiographical profession. In order
 to maintain our status as professionals, however, even we rhetoricians
 concerned with de-mystifying language use cannot fully recognize the
 autobiographical construction of our profession and its authority. Thus,
 Vitanza is again correct when he speculates about composition's reasons
 for disallowing such a critical in(ter)vention as the "perverse comedy"
 that he recommends: that sort of alternative rhetoric would indeed "place
 the field in the midst of a 'legitimation crisis'" (140). Bearing witness to
 our own rhetoricity acknowledges the self-construction of our knowledge
 as well as our efforts to demonstrate cognitive superiority. Thus, in order
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 to avoid such a legitimation crisis, we?like all professionals, particu
 larly those whose status is questionable or fledgling?compose an
 authority that appears to be removed from its material sources in our
 professional practice. Like other professionals, we systematically and
 systemically reroute our professional authority from the transient, con
 textual vicissitudes of our everyday practices and corporeal selves to an
 already constituted and abstract realm of disciplinary subjects, linguistic
 patterns, and texts.
 Within our professional discursive practices, this detour is enabled
 by the gesture, a rhetorical move that shifts authority away from the
 "inside" of our material contexts, to the "outside" of our discursive
 conventions. Under the cover of various discursive gestures, we simulta
 neously invoke that always already constituted disciplinary realm of
 methodologies, subjects, territories, genres, structures, and stylistic con
 ventions of our discipline and disavow the transient, material realm of
 professional practice(s) and corporeal producers of texts. For instance, I
 enable the discourse I present now by gesturing to existing bodies of
 scholarship (autobiography theory by Shari Benstock and Nancy Miller
 as well as sociological analysis of professionalism by Magali Larson);
 similarly, I noted the already constituted project of demonstrating gender
 inequity in discourse and practice. I definitely did not gesture to my
 experiences with, or to my anger and frustration resulting from, these
 inequities. I have authorized (in the abstract) those experiences and
 affective responses by gesturing to another scholar's accepted work with
 "the personal" and by using her term "personal criticism" to assure you
 that I'll focus on the "critical" more than the "personal" aspects of the
 personal. (In the specific, however, I have not gestured to those experi
 ences or feelings?not yet anyway.) Most convincingly, perhaps, my
 references to "deficiency," to something lacking, in the collection Rhe
 torical Bodies and in the work of Miller and Vitanza make my argument
 possible, for therein I deploy the ultimate academic (masculinist) gesture:
 pointing out a lack that my superior mastery will fill.
 As you can see, conventional academic discourse works to entextualize
 an abstract body of knowledge and disembody the individual writer
 because it requires gestures to those methodologies, subjects, territories,
 genres, structures, stylistic conventions and?of course?ideologies of
 our discipline. Historically, paternalistically, conventionally, we have
 been disciplined to see, as Joseph Harris does, "something peculiar about
 downplaying a sense of'mastery' through calling attention to one's self
 (52). By definition, then, our discourse cannot be subversive or counter
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 hegemonic or interventional, for it is doggedly determined to be arhetorical.
 In exchanging positionality for certainty, contingent truth for profes
 sional ideology, we deny the rhetoricity of our own language. When we
 misrecognize our gestures, when we deny the collective but nonetheless
 self-constructed and self-authorized character of disciplinary authority,
 we sentence ourselves to the discipline of the master narrative, to the
 discomfiting position of being rhetoricians who are hostile to (our
 own) rhetoric.
 This institutionally misrecognized discursive practice co-opts the
 feminist project even as it appears to sponsor it. Consider, for instance,
 the past five years or so of the discipline' s apparent and extensive support
 for numerous theoretical explorations of feminism's implications for
 composition theory, methodology, and practice?as evidenced, for ex
 ample, in such volumes as Feminism and Composition Studies, Ethical
 Dilemmas in Feminist Research, Feminisms and Critical Pedagogy.
 Despite their existence and even widespread acceptance, these feminists'
 discursive attempts to appropriate political agency and reinscribe profes
 sional practices and identities have tended to be disembodied and
 therefore disempowered, without access to experiential, autobiographi
 cal authority.
 Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford allude to this conundrum in "Writing
 Back," their invited response to a section ("Exploring Discontinuities")
 of Feminism and Composition Studies. "What significance, if any," they
 ask, "should we (or other readers) attach to the fact that your essays tend
 to accept and embody, rather than to transgress, the conventions of
 traditional academic prose? Does this acceptance and embodiment mark
 a place of paradox and difficulty or does it represent a judicious response
 to your specific rhetorical situations... ?" (318-19). My hunch is that this
 sagacious question is more complex than its either-or articulation sug
 gests, for the answer to the second question is "both." For instance, unless
 she has been granted the license of well-known critics such as Helene
 Cixous or Jane Tompkins, a feminist scholar's "judicious response" to
 most if not all rhetorical situations in which she hopes to be published
 (particularly by the MLA, the publisher of Feminism and Composition
 Studies) is to rely on the conventions of academic prose, and that response
 can and does simultaneously "mark a place of paradox and difficulty."
 Nonetheless, the fact that here and now I am using traditional academic
 prose does not necessarily mean I accept it, nor does it mean I embody it
 in a literal sense. It appears, then, that when Ede and Lunsford refer to
 those who "tend to embody" the "conventions of traditional academic
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 prose," they are figuring those authors as talking heads: I am in their sense
 "embodying" academic prose, but what my physical, determinate body
 now enunciates is unbeknownst to you. In fact, you probably weren't even
 recognizing my body until I brought it up, until I ask you to imagine what
 I'm doing as I write. (Am I frightened/exhilarated/aroused when I point
 out Ede and Lunsford's (mis)use of either-or language? Is my adrenaline
 pumping? Am I sweating and swearing as I write? Does my stomach hurt?
 Am I a straight female? How do I look? Am I dressed? Not?)
 When we do not acknowledge the material conditions of all features
 of our bodies and our "selves" at practice, we undermine feminist
 revisions of discourse. We make it impossible to heed calls like
 Worsham's?one that asks us to "expand our notions of literacy to their
 widest possible circumference, to a point where literacy must involve us,
 and our students, in more than an epistemic relation to the world and to
 the earth" ("Writing"101). This avowed feminist revision is not the only
 casualty of an arhetorical approach to academic discourse: such
 misrecognition also incapacitates the project of subverting oppressive
 power regimes, a form of literacy that Min-Zhan Lu has called "critical
 affirmation" and that relies on "mark[ing] writing, especially personal
 narratives, as a site for reflecting on and revising one's sense of self, one's
 relations with others, and the conditions of one's life" (173).
 We can see then that not j ust feminist goals of regendering masculinist
 practices but also our discipline's epistemology is at stake in recognizing
 our discursive tactics as autobiographical. Insisting on transcendent,
 reified disciplinary authority leaves us vulnerable to domination by
 consent to the ideology of professionalism. And that ideology, like the
 journalistic will to truth that Liu examines, functions as "a key mecha
 nism in regulating the deployment and movement of human resources in
 contemporary rhetorical practices" (316). However, and as we shall see,
 recognizing?indeed, foregrounding?the emergent, fleeting, and tac
 itly autobiographical authority of our discursive community could facili
 tate the professional exigencies of generating knowledge. We need such
 discursive practices to support the mission of subverting the dominant
 (masculinist, oppressive) paradigm and yet maintain our mission to
 profess English; we need a discourse that facilitates the production of, but
 not the passive consumption of, the products of the dominant culture.
 Such facilitation in our scholarly enterprise is crucial to using the
 workplace as a site for converting hegemonic practices to a force that
 effects change. Clearly, we must recognize and self-consciously inscribe
 specifically the autobiographical composition of our authority as pro
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 fessionals. We must feature the rhetoricity of our discursive practice
 and demonstrate its contextualized knowledge claims if we want our
 work as professors of English to avoid the global pretensions of
 hegemony.
 Embodied Rhetoric's "Double Gesture"
 To that end, I propose an embodied rhetoric that, in general terms,
 involves a crucial shift in discursive practice and representation from our
 conventional (mis)recognition of academic discourse as an impersonal,
 detached, objective, structured presentation of clear positions, argu
 ments, and evidence to a less-familiar but more rhetorical approach that
 recognizes academic discourse as a result?a process not a product, an
 epiphenomenon if you prefer?of the discursive practice of academics.
 In specific terms and conventions, embodied academic discourse requires
 gestures to the material practices of the professional group and to the
 quotidian circumstances of the individual writer. Such gestures would
 allow us to work under the cover of professional expertise and to the ends
 of what Michel de Certeau calls "the ordinary," those practices of
 "everyday [wo]man" who uses clever tactics of improvisation to outma
 neuver the discipline of institutions (13). This supplemental tactic that I
 propose could acknowledge the conflicting functions of a professional
 academic: a guardian of cultural capital disciplined by the conventions of
 professional practice and a cultural critic committed to revealing and
 decentering hegemonic domination of access to power and knowledge. It
 could likewise acknowledge the logical contradiction that Fish notes in
 compositionists' persistent attempts to argue for a "pedagogical payoff
 in being opposed to anti-foundationalism and?by implication?to link
 theory with practice at all (335). Embodied rhetoric allows such contra
 diction, for it crosses the ideologically constituted line demarcating a
 logical separation between theory and practice. Instead, it generates a
 both/and professional ideology that recognizes the conditions of its
 construction.
 Let's look more carefully, then, at how we might refigure our
 professional discourse such that it attends to our own textual mechanics
 and avows authority in our practice as professionals rather than only in
 disciplinary, abstracted descriptions and interpretations of ourselves as
 writers and scholars, experts in the field. We've seen that in order to
 recognize the ways we conceal our self-proclaimed authority we must
 gesture to the contexts and intentions of our practice. Acknowledging the
 autobiographically driven aspects of our work as professionals and as
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 individual subjects is how we make our writing mat(t)er(ial). But how
 do we do this?
 We must gesture to our bodies, our lives. Jane Gallop's manifesto
 Thinking Through the Body suggests a method for initiating such ges
 tures. When Gallop describes her efforts as a professional reading
 subject, she says, "I think through autobiography: that is to say, the chain
 of associations that I am pursuing in my reading passes through things that
 happened to me" (4). Likewise, as a professional academic writing
 subject, I can mark my body's presence when I author(ize) texts by calling
 to the surface at least some of the associations that my thinking passes
 through, associations evoked by my gender, race, class, sexual orienta
 tion, politics, and so on. Jacqueline Jones Royster says that she tries to
 think and listen through her associations. The "me" that I want to think
 through is not only someone who professes composition (who's recently
 tenured but still needs to get published, who's committed to the feminist
 enterprise of intervening in patriarchal disciplinarity, who' s a member of
 a "stand alone" department struggling to prove its scholarly worth to a
 large state university aspiring to become a more notable research institu
 tion); she's also a forty-seven year old woman, a feminist partner, a
 recovering alcoholic, a sister, a daughter, a stepdaughter, a landscape
 painter, an ex-wife, and on and on. These sites of my body authorize
 my texts, for the language I use entextualizes these associations
 regardless of whether or not I recognize (or even privilege) that
 process.
 Lest listeners immediately evoke the "essentialism" bandwagon, let
 me hasten to point out that these particular embodiments and their
 individual entextualizations are by no means fixed for any one group or
 even any one individual; in fact, these associations, what Stuart Hall calls
 "connotational chains," can be interrupted. True, my body?like my
 profession?is undeniably implicated in ideological discourses. True?
 and as Hall argues?it's no easy task to change the associations. On the
 other hand, Hall says,
 It is by no means adequately proven that these positionings alone
 constitute the mechanisms whereby all individuals locate themselves in
 ideology. We are not entirely stitched into place in our relation to the
 complex field of historically situated ideological discourses exclu
 sively at that moment alone.... We remain open to be positioned and
 situated in different ways, at different moments throughout our
 existence. (106)
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 According to Hall, then, I?anyone?can simultaneously occupy
 various and perhaps even contradictory positions. Invoking W.E.B. Du
 Bois' The Souls of Black Folk, Royster refers to this capacity as deciding
 one's "rhetorical purpose to be to cross, or at least to straddle boundaries
 with the intent of shedding light" (34). In other words, I can make the
 choice to pledge allegiance to different ideologically inscribed positions
 at different times, choose which of the various positions that I occupy at
 any given historical moment will best define me in a given context. These
 multiple choices provide the agency and the myriad locations I need to
 resist containment and co-optation by uninspected?that is,
 misrecognized?ideologies.
 In order to realize fully the material and therefore fugitive authority
 of these rhetorical choices within my disciplinary discourse, an embodied
 professional rhetoric should recognize and acknowledge how I as author
 and my profession as discipline self-authorize; in other words, such
 discourse must recognize and utilize autobiographical evidence and
 stylistics. As an embodied rhetorician, I accomplish this autobiographical
 aspect of my "data" by drawing attention to?and subsequently destabi
 lizing?the sanctioned gestures informing its "mastery" as a profes
 sional. My embodied rhetoric further recognizes the authority of my
 personal, individual autobiography by gesturing to the chain of
 associations motivating my discourse. Such an approach to our own
 academic discourse proves not only more candid and less elitist, but
 also more potent because it recognizes and professes the situatedness
 of our practice.
 It would seem, then, that the language of the ordinary person
 inscribing his or her everyday life, the language of autobiography, may
 well provide the most effective means of recognizing and subverting
 hegemonic discursive conventions. For, as de Certeau contends, "To
 discuss language 'within' ordinary language, without being able 'to
 command a clear view' of it, without being able to see it from a distance,
 is to grasp it as an ensemble of practices in which one is implicated and
 through which the prose of the world is at work" (11-12). To grasp our
 discourse as "an ensemble of practices"?or, in Foucauldian terms, "to
 restore to discourse its character as an event"?an embodied rhetorician
 who wants to maintain his or her professional obligations must fore
 ground more than his or her professional "positionality" (129). That
 particular discursive gesture has become so commonplace that it' s lost its
 subversive force in all but the most elaborated of examples. (For an
 effective example, see Lu's "Critical Affirmation," which presents three
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 extensive "instances" of Lu's positionality as Asian, as [privileged]
 Asian immigrant and researcher.) Instead, and in order to author a
 subversive ordinary language, I must also foreground my own autobiog
 raphy. I do so by making my scholarly writing "personal" in a very
 particular way: I stage the authority of my expertise and simultaneously
 expose it as a rhetorical pose, a gesture, an authority presumed by the
 autobiography of my profession and of myself as a particular author of
 multiple positions.
 Nancy Miller's notion of "personal criticism" best describes this
 specific kind of autobiography, a discourse that not only reveals its
 internal signature in passages that "invoke that moment in writing when
 everything comes together in a fraction of poise" but also fosters the
 "reclaiming of theory: turning theory back on itself (6, 5). Miller
 explains that the personal in these texts is "at odds with the hierarchies of
 the positional." What's more, she claims,
 By turning its authorial voice into spectacle, personal writing theorizes
 the stakes of its own performance: a personal materialism. Personal
 writing opens an inquiry on the cost of writing... . [It] blows the cover
 of the impersonal as a masquerade of self-effacement... and points to the
 narcissistic fantasy that inheres in the poses of self-sufficiency we
 identify with Theory; notably, those of abstraction. (24, 25)
 What Miller describes as the "poses of self-sufficiency" emerge from
 what I earlier described as the requisite discursive gestures that system
 atically and systemically reroute professional discursive authority from
 everyday practices and corporeal selves to an already constituted abstract
 realm of disciplinary subjects, linguistic patterns, and texts. I also
 described, in addition to abstraction, other masculinist poses of self
 sufficiency that chronicle our fantasy about the nature of academic
 discourse?notably, those of coherence, method(ology), clarity, consis
 tency, impartiality, and, most importantly, rationality. Such poses may
 sustain our professional status, but they remain impotent to recognize
 what I've called the self-professed, self-constructed, self-affirmed, self
 administered composition of academic discourse.
 The vigor of the particular form of professional personal writing that
 I am calling "embodied rhetoric" emerges from its recognition that
 disciplinary knowledge, like autobiographical authority, is contingent on
 disciplinary context, on ever-shifting, transient, emergent events that can
 never be contained, complete, structured. When our discourse implies a
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 coherent, autonomous, unified body of disciplinary knowledge, we
 misrecognize or disavow the authority in which that knowledge is
 grounded. An embodied rhetoric, however, celebrates this discontinuity.
 Such an aspect of discursive authority, Benstock claims,
 might be the most interesting aspect of the autobiographical: the measure
 to which "self and "self-image" might not coincide, can never coincide
 in language . . . because certain forms of self-writing . . . have no
 investment in creating a cohesive self over time. Indeed, they seem to
 exploit difference and change over sameness and identity: their writing
 follows the "seam" of the conscious/unconscious where boundaries
 between internal and external overlap. (148)
 Benstock defines that "seam" as "the space of difference, the gap that the
 drive toward unity ofselfcan never entirely close.. .the space of writing."
 She further characterizes autobiography as "a coming together of method
 [writing] and subject matter [self-hood]," a method that "reveals gaps,
 and not only gaps in time and space or between the individual and the
 social, but also a widening divergence between the manner and matter of
 its discourse" (146). For us as professionals, this coming together of our
 discursive matter and method is crucial to our success as professors of
 academic discourse because it demystifies the nature of our professional
 expertise; facilitates more sincere, straightforward professional author
 ity; and subverts the totalizing effects of the hierarchies of disciplinarity.
 Embodied rhetoric could indeed facilitate that kind of professional
 success. However, in order to exploit autobiographical authority' s unique
 capacity to "reveal gaps" in the manner and matter of my professional
 writing, I must not attempt to write my (professional) life or my body (of
 knowledge) as a unified whole. By the same token, I need not?in fact,
 should not?construct a binary opposition between my organic "real" self
 and my traditional, dispassionate, disembodied?and therefore ulti
 mately essentialized?professional self. As Royster explains this point,
 "all my voices are authentic" (37). Thus, in order to maintain my
 discursive professionalism and simultaneously resist disciplinarity, I
 must utilize what Shirley Neuman calls the "poetics of difference" that
 emerges from an autobiographical discourse that accommodates the
 specificity and the possible agency of the subject/author of discourse.
 "Such a subject," Neuman explains, "is neither the unified subject of
 traditional theory of autobiography nor the discursively produced and
 dispersed subject of poststructuralist theory_It is a complex, multiple,
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 layered subject with agency in the discourses and the worlds that
 constitute the referential space of his or her autobiography, a self not only
 constructed by differences but capable of choosing, inscribing, and
 making a difference" (225). Here we see, at last, the crux of Benstock's
 claim that "the question of'genre' often rides on the question of gender,"
 since the notion of carefully circumscribed and clearly demarcated
 boundaries between "self and other is a gendered one (148). When she
 and other feminist theorists of women's autobiography incorporate
 difference into earlier, masculinist notions of autobiography (such as
 Gusdorf s) as an attempt to construct a unified and unique self, they
 demonstrate that such a limited understanding of that genre does not
 account for authors whose reflections in the cultural hall of mirrors does
 not reflect unique or unified individuals.
 Susan Friedman?expanding on Sheila Rowbotham's Woman's
 Consciousness, Man's World?explains how women's experience of self
 does not (necessarily) include the privilege of conceiving of oneself as
 isolate or individual: "A woman cannot, Rowbotham argues, experience
 herself as an entirely unique entity because she is always aware of how
 she is being defined as woman, that is, as a member of a group whose
 identity has been defined by the dominant male culture" (75). Friedman
 writes, "Not recognizing themselves in the reflections of cultural repre
 sentations, women develop dual consciousness," a sense of self that
 "directly parallels W.E.B. Du Bois' identification of a dual conscious
 ness for blacks living in a dominant white culture" (75, 76). Such a
 separation affects women's discursive representations of themselves,
 Friedman explains, creating a powerful "poetics of difference" in women's
 autobiography: "Cultural representations of woman lead not only to
 women's alienation, but also to the potential for a 'new consciousness'
 of self. . . . Not recognizing themselves in the reflections of cultural
 representation, women develop a dual consciousness?the self as cultur
 ally defined and the self as different from cultural prescription" (75). For
 women autobiographers, she continues, this sense of self and group
 identity is dually inscribed in "an identity that is not purely individualis
 tic" or "purely collective" (76).
 Notice how this explanation of a self that is made possible by shifting
 what we recognize as an autobiographical act is much like the shift in
 gesture that I've suggested we academics can make possible by
 foregrounding the self-constructed aspects of our professional authority.
 For us as academic professionals, such a dually inscribed identity could
 give rise to a less-disciplined, more autonomous but nonetheless profes
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 sionally sanctioned scholar. If we attend to the lessons found in Friedman's
 analyses of women autobiographers, we see that inscribing such an
 identity must originate from feeling and in the body: "Alienation from the
 historically imposed image of the self is what motivates the writing, the
 creation of an alternate self in the autobiographical act. Writing the self
 shatters the cultural hall of mirrors and breaks the silence imposed by
 male speech" (76). For my purposes, however, it is crucial to amend
 Friedman's description: I want to use the term "masculinist" rather than
 "male," for the self reflected in our professional culture's hall of mirrors
 and its requisite silence can be (indeed, often has been for me anyway)
 imposed by females' as well as males' masculinist speech; likewise, a
 male may be just as alienated from the profession's historically imposed
 image of self as I often am.
 In other words, in the case of the professional academic, a felt
 dissonance is what provides discursive inspiration for the type of personal
 criticism that I am proposing: an awareness of an essential(ist) tension
 between what I say and what I do as a professional, between what I must
 do because I am disciplined by the profession's conventions and what I
 can say even as I write about disciplinary matters like, say, facilitating
 agency and decentering hegemonic conventions; that tension is what
 provokes my words. Such a complex, even contradictory, discursive
 identity can be acknowledged in an embodied professional discourse, for
 a discourse that gestures to conventional disciplinary authority and to
 professional practice reveals the "gaps" between what I say and what I do;
 such discourse could shatter the mystery of academic authority and the
 professed coherence of professional identity.
 As Friedman proposes in her account of women autobiographers'
 "awareness of the meaning of the cultural category WOMAN," I am
 proposing rhetorical moves that acknowledge dominant categories ("dis
 ciplinary knowledge" and "professor") and undermine their authority.
 This turning of disciplinary authority back on itself as a form of resistance
 is made possible when we simultaneously gesture to the transient and
 contextual self and to the authority constructed in the act of writing. The
 writingprocess' capacity to formally indicate butnotpossessnondiscursive
 activities enables this simultaneous gesturing. As Neuman explains,
 This complex... process of inventing a self in autobiographies by women
 or in poetics of women's autobiography is often defined as a double
 gesture by which the narrator presents herself or is read as culturally
 defined as a woman and as "different from cultural prescription," as both
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 the product of social discourse and as individual. . . . [T]he quest for
 individual autonomy without renouncing a collective identity... emerges
 as a structure that is modified, but not abandoned. (218; emphasis added)
 The academic version of such a "double gesture," as you may recall,
 involves staging the authority of professional expertise and simulta
 neously exposing it as a pose. In other words, in the act of invoking
 disciplinary authority by making the requisite gesture to the abstract
 realm of disciplinary knowledge, I as writer undermine its authority by
 self-consciously noting my disciplined, discursive performance and
 likewise gesturing to the material dominion of my personal and/or
 professional life. That is, I point to myself as a constructed professional
 and myself as an autonomous professional, myself as professional disci
 plinarian, and myself as democratic individual. The duality without
 duplicity of this gesture restores not j ust sincerity and agency but body to
 my professional discourse.
 Articulating New Paradigms
 What I wanted to do was to tell you the story of how I came to recognize
 much of what I discuss herein, especially the point about the hostility to
 rhetoric inherent in our professional discursive practices. In fact, an
 earlier version of this essay did begin by describing a discussion between
 graduate students and me when we read Stanley Fish's "Anti
 foundationalism, Theory Hope, and the Teaching of Composition" in our
 Research Methods in Rhetoric and Composition course. My students'
 questions brought into sharp relief the otherwise ill-defined ideological
 conflicts inherent in the profession's (my) endorsement of Fish's
 argument(s) and its (my) self-definitions. In that course, we'd read
 various compositionists' arguments favoring anti-foundationalist stances,
 in particular Stephen North's chapters on practitioners, chapters in
 Contending with Words, and Patricia Bizzell's specific explanation of
 anti-foundationalism's value to pedagogy. When we then read a
 counterargument, Fish's "Anti-foundationalism," my students were out
 raged. I paraphrase their reactions:
 If Stanley Fish already proved?and that was several years ago?that
 practice has nothing to do with theory, then why do people keep trying to
 prove that it does? So many of the research methods we've studied and
 even your advice to us as fledgling researchers all focus on an application
 of theory to the composition classroom; most of the articles we've read,
 even the abstract theoretical ones, seem to require an "application to the
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 classroom" section. If everybody already knows?because Stanley Fish
 said it?that there' s no logical connection between theory and pedagogy,
 then why do they keep on trying to find one? What's up with that? Are
 they just stupid? Don't they read him? If they disagree with him, why
 don't they say so directly rather than just ignore him? What's the point of
 people writing all these articles if everyone apparently ignores them
 anyway?
 Earlier, I wanted to follow that episode by describing at length my
 subsequent process of scrutinizing Fish's rhetoric in that article as well
 as in his examinations of anti-professionalism and the professional
 practice of blind submission. My earlier draft's analysis of that rhetoric
 was meant to demonstrate Fish's own contradictory moves: because he
 relies on logic to make his point in "Anti-foundationalism," Fish engages
 in the same anti-professional stance that he mocks in others. Berating J.
 Hillis Miller's,Bizzell's, Robert Scholes' andothers' attempts to connect
 anti-foundationalist theory with pedagogical practices and thereby dem
 onstrate "that what they do can be justified or explained by a set of
 principles that stands apart from their practice, by a theory," Fish enables
 his logical superiority but disavows the exigencies of rhetorical practice
 (354). What Fish's critique leaves unsaid, then, is that given their
 rhetorical situation those compositionists "swerve" from the logical
 consequences of anti-foundationalist theory because professionally they
 cannot do otherwise: even when arguing that all knowledge is situated
 and that therefore no rule or maxim can be detached from professional
 practice, an academic must also argue that his or her particular maxim or
 rule or insight is authorized by something other than his or her practice,
 life, or self. Hence, what Fish criticizes as a logical contradiction is
 simultaneously a rhetorical necessity. Further, as evidence of profes
 sional discourse's ideological control of the flow of embodied rhetorical
 resources, it demonstrates that professional discourse allows
 compositionists to deny Fish's gesture to the logic of noncontradiction
 but has disavowed or at least mystified any complementary gesture to the
 rhetorical requirements of material discursive conditions.
 That was the story I wanted to tell. But when in my earlier draft I made
 the gesture to story?especially right off the bat and especially at
 length?a professional's review advised me to "imagine, in other words,
 a revised essay that did not feel it was necessary to dredge up Fish (Ugh?
 are we still mired in the foundationalism/anti-foundationalism debate?)."
 Even for the reviewer who appreciated my story, the narrative got in the
 way of my point: "The earlier discussions of Fish were interesting, but I
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 kept wondering why you were spending so much time on him_I kept
 wondering how Fish's article was attached to current scholarly conver
 sations and to your definition of embodied rhetoric."
 I give you these two examples primarily to answer what I anticipate
 as a very reasonable objection you may have: why does someone arguing
 for an embodied professional rhetoric write such?more or less?disem
 bodied prose?3 One reason is that it's difficult to get professional readers
 to engage in what Krista Ratcliffe calls "rhetorical listening," a method
 of listening (or in this case "reading") in ways that "promote a feminist
 literacy": it's unfamiliar and therefore difficult to read (195). From
 readers grown accustomed to conventional discursive practices, it beck
 ons responses like this one from yet a third reviewer: "What I love about
 [other autobiographers] is that they don't trivialize their autobiographi
 cally grounded rhetoric by presenting it as a 'gesture.'" Similarly, it is
 difficult?for me anyway?to write embodied professional rhetoric well:
 in trying to use conventional rhetoric to establish ethos and credibility to
 authorize embodied rhetoric, I make many mistakes. I take too long to get
 to the point, apparently unable to stay within the conventional article
 length of twenty or so pages. I often don't cite the most appropriate
 representations of current scholarly debate (I cannot necessarily control
 or predict the sites of the debates that animate me, that invoke my
 embodied responses). I don't explain myself very well (of course I didn't
 want to dredge up the foundationalism/anti-foundationalism debate. The
 essay "Anti-foundationalism" is merely the site of my own and my
 students' irritation and of my later rhetorical analysis; otherwise, its
 content is irrelevant to my purpose here. Furthermore, I believe that
 acknowledging my discourse as a series of rhetorical moves neither
 undermines nor disowns it: gesturing to my own body or life story no more
 trivializes it than the announcement, "By the authority invested in me
 by the state of_" undermines the authority of a person allowed
 to say, "I now pronounce you man and wife." The gesture directs
 attention to the source of the authority, but it does not thereby
 diminish that authority.)
 Nonetheless (and here's another important reason why I gesture to
 reviewers' reactions to my earlier draft), professional readers' reactions
 can help me to focus my embodied professional discourse. For instance,
 I discovered that, indeed, I can tell my "story" much more briefly, and in
 doing so I rediscovered the point of embodying my argument. Proving
 that Fish contradicts himself, too (or at least denies the material condi
 tions of compositionists' professional discourse), is not what I want to
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 foreground. No. What I do want my story to emphasize is how I felt during
 my graduate students' and my discussion of Fish's article and how those
 feelings shaped my multiple responses. I was particularly animated by
 these student reactions: "If everybody already knows?because Stanley
 Fish said it?that there's no logical connection between theory and
 pedagogy, then why do they keep on trying to find one? What's up with
 that? Are they just stupid? ... What's the point of all these articles?" My
 visceral responses were many. My flushed, hot skin and my quickened
 heart rate brought to light my undeniable but not publicly expressed
 feelings: anger ("No, they're not 'stupid,' you arrogant jerks. And who
 are you to think that you know more than the experts? You're the students
 here."); fear ("Geez, these guys are right. We do look pretty stupid, don't
 we? These students see this better than I do."); and shame ("I don't know
 why we write all that stuff except that we have to in order to keep our jobs.
 How ridiculous is that! Why have I chosen such an absurd way to make
 a living?").
 I imagine my students could see my flush and make assumptions
 about its source, but what they heard (I think) was my jarring laugh
 followed by my careful explanation: "While I can understand how the
 situation appears ridiculous to you, I can tell you that the reason that
 compositionists persist in connecting theory and practice is that it's part
 of the job. We do it because we have to." Thus, a further important aspect
 of my story is its demonstration of the rhetorical choices I made in
 distinguishing which responses would be private, which public. My
 voiced response at the time of the event embodies the effects of
 disciplinarity, the ways that even "what we take to be the most private and
 personal of phenomena?emotion and the body?are effects of social
 organization and are made available for public administration through the
 techniques of discipline" (Worsham, "Rhetoric" 397). I felt frustrated
 and fettered by my own public response, however, probably because
 "that's the way we've always done it" responses to my own legitimate
 intellectual inquiries have always enraged me. To my own dismay, I saw
 that I'd become?or at least acted like?one of the "because I'm the Mom
 and I said so" authority figures I'd always abhorred, someone who
 preferred to subdue rather than empower intellectual curiosity. I'd seen
 the "enemy" and it was I. This "alienation from the historically imposed
 image of the self is what motivate[d] the writing" of an embodied,
 multiply-motivated self: immediately after class, I wrote up much of my
 earlier draft's analysis of Fish's rhetoric, searching for the position that
 would "break the silence imposed by male speech" (Friedman 76). I read
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 more Fish than I ever had before; I also felt quite confident in challenging
 him on at least this one point.
 Clearly, then, my story is also important because it exemplifies the
 way our discipline "works at both the semantic and affective levels to
 produce and organize knowledge and experience" (Worsham, "Rhetoric"
 397). In later discussions in that same graduate course?discussions
 focused usually on articles in Contending with Words?I often cited to
 students their reactions to Fish's article as an example of what Worsham
 and Vitanza might mean when they point out the necessity of alternative
 rhetorics in composition studies. Needless to say, an example that they'd
 generated themselves facilitated their comprehension. To be quite hon
 est, my students' earlier questions and my subsequent analysis of Fish's
 rhetorical moves facilitated my own understanding of those authors' calls
 for difference and rhetoricity in professional discourse. Thus, the mate
 rial conditions in our classroom obviously resulted in, among other
 things, this essay; my feelings at the time produced and organized my
 professional process of producing knowledge. Most importantly, without
 my students' unprofessional?that is, not controlled by professional
 ideology?responses, I may not have seen and certainly would not have
 understood as well the crucial, rhetorical, and embodied connection
 between my own theory and practice.
 I hope, then, that we can now agree in our answers to the following
 question, one previously posed by Yumeng Liu:
 Shall we work toward relaxing the prohibitive "procedures" [of discur
 sive practices] and facilitating an ever freer flow of rhetorical resources,
 or shall we continue to impose a restrictive regime in the name of political
 commitment, ethical integrity, or ideological probity, even at the cost of
 a rhetorical study or theory divorced from what is going on rhetorically
 in the actual world, and unable to exert much material impact on it? (325)
 I hope, too, that I've been able in this short time to elucidate how feminist
 theorists' explanations of autobiographical gestures' capacity to ac
 knowledge ideological cultural representations and simultaneously au
 thorize writers' material contexts suggest an alternative rhetoric. Further,
 I trust that I've demonstrated the radical potential of such feminist
 discourse to elude the problematics of an insincere avowal of a continu
 ous self and to subvert hegemonic and/or essentialist definitions of
 identity. Finally, I hope I've convinced you theoretically and perhaps
 practically that similar use of autobiographical gestures in our own
 Jane E. Hindman  115
 professional academic discourse may well resolve the tensions inherent
 in our personal and professional identities and facilitate our construction
 of a self and a profession more autonomous, less unified.
 If so, then you are apt to see, as Michel de Certeau does, that the
 language of an ordinary person inscribing his or her everyday life may
 well provide a more effective means of recognizing and subverting
 hegemonic discursive conventions than our specialized, conventional,
 professional language has provided. In The Practice of Everyday Life, de
 Certeau tells us that unlike the "Expert's discourse," the ordinary person's
 inscription of his or her own everyday practice "does not profit from
 knowledge by exchanging it against the right to speak in its name; he [or
 she] retains its exactingness but not its mastery" (13). He writes,
 This is no longer the position of professionals, supposed to be civilized
 men among savages; it is rather the position which consists in being a
 foreigner at home, a "savage" in the midst of ordinary culture_[S]ince
 one cannot find another place from which to interpret it_since, in short
 there is no way out, the fact remains that we are foreigners on the inside?
 but there is no outside. (13-14)
 And since there is no outside?no reified Knowledge or Truth from
 which we can speak as experts or even as wholly completed selves?then
 recognizing ourselves carousing on the inside, noticing ourselves basking
 at that center and turning it out for all to see (in other words, authorizing
 the practice of our everyday professional life) is the way that we can attain
 a "fraction of poise," gain local knowledge, and resist being always
 already inscribed by the language we compose.4
 San Diego State University
 San Diego, California
 Notes
 1. Though the "genre" I discuss is our own professional discourse, I
 recognize that the status of academic discourse as a discrete "genre" is neither
 undisputed nor unified. Given, however, my fairly cohesive audience of rhetoric
 and composition specialists and given my further qualification that?for my
 particular purposes here?what I mean by professional academic discourse is
 the sort of writing typically published in our disciplinary journals, I trust that
 readers will invoke relatively consistent notions of the kind of prose I am
 talking about.
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 2. What may be distinctive of us as professional academics is that we
 additionally and simultaneously insist on touting ourselves as facilitators of
 democratic access to the sites of our professional power and knowledge. Thus,
 for those of us who profess rhetoric and composition, a most disingenuous but
 seductive avowal is our telling ourselves?as Bizzell has told us?that "our task
 is ... to share a discourse" (262).
 3. For an example of my own embodied professional rhetoric, see "Making."
 4.1 gratefully acknowledge Krista Ratcliffe's reading of an earlier version
 of this draft (especially her gracious willingness to be accountable for her
 "blind" review by signing it). Her insights?particularly in distinguishing
 between a rhetorical and logical connection of ideas?greatly facilitated my
 naming my point and getting to it. Thank you, Krista, for your excellent
 rhetorical listening.
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